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Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining?
A Test Using Dual Jobholders
Marta Lachowska, Alexandre Mas, Rafaele Saggio, and Stephen A. Woodbury
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n We propose a test to
distinguish between wage
posting and wage bargaining.
n Using dual jobholders in
Washington State, we estimate
the sensitivity of wages and
separation rates to wage
shocks in a secondary job, our
measure of outside option.
n In lower parts of the
wage distribution, improved
outside options lead to higher
separations rates but not to
higher wages, consistent with
wage posting.
n In the highest wage quartile,
improved outside options lead
to higher wages, but not higher
separation rates, consistent
with bargaining.
n In the aggregate, bargaining
appears to be a limited
determinant of wage setting.
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How wages are set is a central question for
research on unemployment, business cycles, and
wage inequality. Two main frameworks for wage
setting are wage bargaining and wage posting.
Models of wage bargaining assume that workers
have the ability to negotiate compensation with
their employer, and that wages incorporate
information about an individual worker’s outside
option. Te alternative to bargaining is wage
posting, whereby an employer ofers a package of
compensation that the worker must take or leave.
Under wage posting, wages only respond to outside
options measured at the market level—changes
in an individual worker’s outside option have no
infuence.
Hall and Krueger (2010, 2012) obtained direct
evidence by surveying a representative sample of
newly hired workers in the United States and found
that one-third reported bargaining over pay before
accepting their position. Hall and Krueger’s work
stimulated several studies using observational data:
Faberman et al. (2017) found that workers who
could have stayed in their jobs before accepting
another position reported obtaining a higher
wage, and Lachowska (2017) found that workers’
subjective assessments of how easy it would be to
fnd an alternative job or to be replaced in their
current jobs are highly correlated with the wage
received in their current jobs. Tis early research
suggests a signifcant role for workers’ outside
options and bargaining in determining wages.
In this article, we summarize a diferent
approach to understanding the relative importance
of wage bargaining and wage posting. Te
approach is based on the experience of dual
jobholders observed in linked employer-employee
wage records from Washington State. We measure
the change in a dual jobholder’s outside option at
the primary job as the change in the average wage
of the worker’s coworkers in the secondary job.1 By
using this worker-specifc measure of the outside

option, we can estimate how primary-job wages
react to wage changes in secondary jobs while
controlling other changes afecting all workers at
the primary employer. Finding that primary-job
wages respond to wage changes in the secondary
job suggests wage bargaining; absence of a wage
response suggests wage posting.
To more clearly distinguish wage posting
from wage bargaining, we also examine whether

Individual wage bargaining occurs
only in the top one-fourth of the
wage distribution. For other workers,
wage setting is characterized by
wage posting, or take-it-or-leave-it
ofers by employers.
separations from the primary job are related to
wage changes in the secondary job. In a job where
wages are posted and not negotiable, we expect
workers to respond to a better outside option by
leaving the job for that option. In our setting, the
job ofering the better outside option is the dual
jobholder’s secondary job.
Who Leaves and Who Bargains?
Figure 1 shows how the distribution of dual
jobholding by industry in the sample we analyze
compares to the industry distribution of single
jobholders. Dual jobholding is concentrated in
service sectors—health care, accommodation
and food services, and retail trade—with these
industries roughly equally represented among
primary and secondary jobs. Workers in
manufacturing, information, and fnance and
insurance are less likely to be dual jobholders.
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Using this sample of dual
jobholders, the analysis points to two
main fndings. First, changes in a
worker’s wage in the primary job are
only weakly relative to changes in the
wages of coworkers in the secondary
job. Overall, then, bargaining plays
a quite limited role in wage setting.

Consistent with previous research,
we fnd that employers limit work
hours on primary jobs, creating a
motive to moonlight for workers
who want additional income.
Rather, when wages on the secondary
job improve, workers tend to leave
the primary job for the secondary job.
Specifcally, a 10 percent increase in the
outside option leads to a 4 percentage
point increase in the probability

of transitioning to the job ofering
the better outside option. Given the
low baseline separation rates in our
sample, this estimate represents a large
increase.
Second, we fnd substantial
diferences in the prevalence of
bargaining and posting among diferent
groups of workers. Specifcally,
bargaining is more prevalent among
workers in the top 25 percent of the
wage distribution. For these highwage workers, better outside options
tend to result in higher wages on the
primary job rather than separation
and movement to the secondary
job. But for workers in the lowest 25
percent of the wage distribution, we
see no evidence of pay increases on the
primary job from improved outside
options. Instead, we see separation
from the primary job, consistent
with wage posting and an absence of
bargaining.

Figure 1: Where Do Dual Jobholders Work?
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NOTE: The fgure shows the proportion of single jobholders (black bars), of the primary job of dual jobholders
(red bars), and of the secondary job of dual jobholders (blue bars), by industry. Observations of single
jobholders and of dual jobholders’ primary jobs in educational services and public administration are omitted.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.
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Figure 2 elaborates on this point,
showing that sectors of the economy
where improved outside options lead to
wage increases tend to be those where
improved outside options lead to fewer
separations. Specifcally, the horizontal
axis shows the estimated efect of a 1
percent improvement in the outside
option on the primary-job wages, while
the vertical axis shows the estimated
efect of a 1 percent improvement in
the outside option on the likelihood
of separating from the primary job
and moving to the secondary job.
As indicated by the dashed, best-ft
line, there is an inverse relationship:
following an improvement in workers’
outside options, employers either
negotiate with them for better pay or
the workers leave the employer for the
job ofering the better outside option.
For example, in fnance and insurance,
employers tend to respond to improved
outside options by negotiating a higher
wage. In contrast, in health care and
accommodation and food services,
improved outside options tend to lead
to a separation.
Efects of Changes in Hours on the
Primary Job
Te data also allow us to study how
wage changes in one job afect hours
worked in the other jobs. Tis feature
helps us understand why workers
choose to moonlight. Tere are two
results. First, we fnd that work hours
with the primary jobs are insensitive
to the changes in the worker’s outside
option. Tis is consistent with a
simple model, outlined in the working
paper, where workaholics face limits
on the hours they can work in their
primary jobs and take a second job for
extra income. In other words, people
moonlight because they want extra
income and their main jobs do not let
them add hours.
Second, we fnd moderate, but
signifcant, efects of wage changes in
a worker’s primary job and the hours
worked on the secondary job. Because
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Conclusions
Our fndings show that wage
posting is a common feature of the
labor market, and that separation is
the main response to improved outside
options, particularly for low-wage
workers. On the other hand, wage
bargaining is not as prevalent in the
data, except perhaps when considering
higher-wage workers.
Our approach to measuring the
outside options of individual workers
can be applied to any setting with
linked employer-employee data
and multiple jobholders. However,
the results may not generalize to
groups of dual jobholders working
in nonstandard work arrangements.
Tese nonstandard arrangements
include electronically mediated “gig”
jobs and other independent contractor
positions that are not currently covered
by administrative wage records. Future
research may answer whether these
workers have little power to negotiate
wages or whether they bargain over
wages.
Note
1. We describe our approach in greater
detail in the accompanying W.E. Upjohn
Institute working paper (Lachowska et al.
2022). Our approach is related to work by
Caldwell and Harmon (2019), who examine
how wages are afected by changes in the
wages of former coworkers.
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Figure 2: How a 1 Percent Improvement in the Outside Option Afects Wages in the
Primary Job and the Likelihood of the Secondary Job Becoming the Primary Job,
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hours on the primary job are essentially
fxed, a change in the primary-job
wage results in additional earnings
without a change in work efort—what
economists call an income efect. We
fnd that this income efect is similar
to those found in studies of individuals
winning lotteries.
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NOTE: This scatterplot shows the efect, by industry, of a 1 percent higher coworker average wage on the
secondary job on the log wage of the primary job among stayers (horizontal axis) and on the likelihood of
the secondary job becoming the primary job (vertical axis). The slope of the dashed, best-ft line is negative,
indicating that sectors in which primary job wages rise are less likely to result in separations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Washington State wage records.
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